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A Comment on “Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices 
Right” by Muller and Mendelsohn 
 Art Fraas and Randall Lutter 
Abstract 
In their recent paper , Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right (henceforth, EPR), 
Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates 
information on damages caused by emissions from specific sources: ―The science and economics related 
to pollution control‖, they write, ―have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-
effectiveness to efficiency.‖ We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that 
source-specific marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with 
the empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR finding of 
negative marginal damages from NOx emissions for many heavily populated counties. The associated 
nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to 
unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also discuss how the EPR assumption that the 
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A Comment on “Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices 
Right” by Muller and Mendelsohn 
 Art Fraas and Randall Lutter 
Introduction 
For the last 20 years, the established wisdom among most environmental economists and 
policymakers is that a cap-and-trade system is the most desirable approach to controlling 
emissions because it is cost-effective. But in their recent paper, ―Efficient Pollution Regulation: 
Getting the Prices Right‖ (henceforth, EPR), Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more 
appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates information on damages caused by emissions 
from specific sources: ―The science and economics related to pollution control,‖ they write, 
―have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to 
efficiency‖ (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009, 1735). They recommend a regulatory program that 
would equate marginal abatement costs with marginal damages—expressed as dollars per ton of 
pollutant emitted--for each source.  
This recommendation constitutes a large departure from existing policy, going well 
beyond the modest regional refinements to ton-for-ton trading approaches that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) already considered and rejected (U.S. EPA 
1998a,1998b). It also departs from recommendations by other researchers to differentiate tons by 
region (e.g., Banzhaf et al. 2004). As a result, it merits scrutiny and discussion. 
We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that source-specific 
marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with the 
empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR 
finding of negative marginal damages for many heavily populated counties. The associated 
nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to 
unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also show how the EPR assumption that the 
regulators know damages with certainty oversimplifies key aspects of efficient air pollution 
regulation.  
                                                 
 Both authors are visiting scholars at Resources for the Future. They are grateful to David McLaughlin for research 
assistance and especially to Jhih-Shyang Shih and Dallas Burtraw for helpful comments. Send correspondence to 
fraas@rff.org. Resources for the Future  Fraas and Lutter 
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Negative Marginal Damage Estimates 
EPR concludes that ―the marginal damages of emissions are especially high in large 
metropolitan areas compared with low-population rural areas‖ (p. 1736). But this statement 
neglects the findings of EPR’s Appendix B, which lists 42 counties with negative estimates of 
damages from ground-level sources of nitrogen oxides (NOx). As shown in Figure 1, which 
zooms into counties in the eastern United States, most of the counties are heavily populated 
urban areas with large aggregate NOx emissions. They represent parts of most major U.S. 
metropolitan areas, including Chicago, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New York City, Boston, 
Los Angeles and the Bay Area as well as the smaller cities of Pittsburgh, Detroit, and New 
Orleans.
1 The results are not minor modeling anomalies: the average marginal damages from 
emissions in these 42 counties are -$972 per ton of NOx emitted, meaning there are benefits. Six 
such counties in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, D.C., 
Philadelphia, and New York City have damages < -$2,000 per ton.  
Fann et al. (2009) use a different model and definitions of sources and geographic areas 
than do Muller and Mendelsohn but find similar evidence. They report negative damages for 
NOx emissions from mobile sources in Chicago and all sources except electric generating units in 
Atlanta, New York City and Philadelphia, Phoenix, and Seattle.
2  Fann et al. describe the effect 
of possible reductions in emissions of NOx: ―Less NOx titration of O3 results in more O3 and 
oxidants available to oxidize NOx to form HNO3, which subsequently react with NH3 to form 
more particulate nitrate (and thus disbenefit)‖ (2007, 175).  EPA posted updates of the work by 
Fann et al. on its website earlier this year (U.S. EPA 2011).  
These estimates of negative marginal damages in urban areas indicate nonconvexities 
because marginal damages are presumably positive at some lower level of emissions. The 
economics literature has recognized issues raised by nonconvexities in the context of pollution 
for decades (Baumol and Bradford 1972). In an evaluation of pollution control focused on ozone, 
                                                 
1 The counties include Los Angeles County and nearby Orange County; Cobb County and DeKalb County, which 
includes Atlanta; Cook County and DuPage County, which include parts of Chicago; Jefferson Parish and Orleans 
Parish, which includes New Orleans; Baltimore County; Montgomery County and Prince George’s County near 
Washington, D.C.; Macomb County outside Detroit; New York City’s Kings County, Nassau County, and Queens 
County, plus nearby Westchester County; and Philadelphia County. These few counties alone have a population in 
excess of 30 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). 
2 Note that the geographic areas Fann et al. analyzed are not counties or standard metropolitan areas. For example, 
the area dubbed ―Chicago‖ includes parts of northwest Indiana and ―New York/ Philadelphia‖ includes areas in five 
states from Connecticut to Delaware. See Fann et al. 2009, Table 2.  Resources for the Future  Fraas and Lutter 
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Repetto (1987, 14) states that in the presence of a nonconvexity, an ―all-or-nothing choice is 
indicated.‖
3  
Negative marginal damage estimates prevent the use of trading ratios based on source-
specific estimates of marginal damages. The EPR first-order conditions for minimization of costs 
subject to an overall cap on damages imply  
1)  for all i and j,  
where the marginal costs of reducing emissions   are  and marginal damages are   
But 1) cannot be satisfied if marginal damages are negative for some sources unless 
marginal control costs are negative for those same sources, a possibility inconsistent with Muller 
and Mendelsohn’s empirical implementation for SO2 (equation (32)).  
Use of source-specific trading ratios,   can ensure that trades do not increase 
damages, provided that  is set equal to  
2) ,  
which can be derived by totally differentiating a general damage function , with 
damages and other emissions held constant. Competition in the market for permits serves to 
equalize the marginal cost of avoiding damages among all sources. But if marginal damages are 
negative for some source i, then use of source-specific trading ratios would mean source i could 
sell permits (while increasing emissions) to another source with positive marginal damages that 
also would increase its emissions. Trades where both sources increase their emissions do not 
represent a stable outcome because sources with negative estimated damages would generally 
supply permits at lower cost than other sources.
4 Put differently, the use of source-specific 
trading ratios in the presence of negative marginal damages for some sources could mean that 
                                                 
3 He also notes that a decentralized incentive system (such as Pigouvian taxes) may not result in an efficient 
allocation of resources.  
4 EPR contains another proposal—source-specific taxes based on estimates of marginal damages—that does not 
work much better with negative marginal damage estimates. It would lead to subsidies for some sources to increase 
their emissions. Unless the cost of an emissions increase also rises as emissions increase, such subsidies could entail 
substantial costs to the public treasury. Resources for the Future  Fraas and Lutter 
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emissions grow everywhere, but especially in the urban areas with negative marginal damage 
estimates for NOx. Adopting the EPR approach of damage-based trading would mean that 
emissions of all pollutants would grow with interpollutant trading, even though only NOx 
emissions have negative marginal damage estimates.  
Uncertainty  
EPR assumes that the regulator knows damages with certainty. Yet the uncertainty is 
large enough that marginal damages from a specific source may be either positive or negative 
depending on how air quality is modeled; where geographic boundaries are located; whether the 
focus is on annual, seasonal, or daily effects; and how variable are the emissions. Consider, for 
example, the discrepancies between EPR and Fann et al.’s study. EPR provides negative 
estimates of marginal damages for NOx emissions in Denver County, Colorado, and Alameda 
County, California, while Fann et al. report positive damage estimates for larger areas (mostly 
rural) that include these two counties. And for Atlanta, Fann et al. report negative damages (of    
-$4,100 per ton) for ammonia emissions, a result that is inconsistent with EPR.
5 Implausibly, the 
model used in EPR generates a quasi-checkerboard pattern of positive and negative damage 
estimates among some neighboring counties.
6 Since the sign of the marginal damage estimates is 
sensitive to small differences in air quality modeling, the full scope of the nonconvexity in 
damages is unclear without a better appraisal of how damage estimates change with alternative 
modeling approaches. 
Uncertainty in even the sign of the marginal damage estimates undermines the claim in 
EPR that ―regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency‖ (p. 1735). Table 4 of 
EPR lists trading ratios between 1:1 and 10:1 for ground-level sources of sulfur dioxide and 
nearby power plants. The wide ranges of these trading ratios and adjacent counties’ marginal 
damage estimates raise questions about whether specific trades would hurt the environment. 
EPA, state, and local regulatory authorities historically have been risk averse and will be 
reluctant to approve or endorse trades between neighboring sources without an assurance of 
                                                 
5 A complete discussion of uncertainty also ought to include analysis of why the different models disagree on the 
direction (sign) of the effect for some pollutants in some specific places.  
6 Within the metropolitan area of Atlanta, Georgia, one county with positive damage estimates (Fulton) separates 
two contiguous counties with negative damage estimates (Clayton and DeKalb) from a third with a negative damage 
estimate (Cobb). Resources for the Future  Fraas and Lutter 
5 
some environmental benefits. Their precaution has cause: when the D.C. Circuit remanded 
EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), it cited EPA’s failure to show that actual emissions 
reductions in neighboring states with the CAIR cap-and-trade program would protect the air 
quality in North Carolina.  
Finally, the uncertainty associated with the marginal damage estimates suggests that 
adopting source-specific trading ratios may invite rampant rent-seeking. Sources would seek a 
re-estimation to yield a lower damage estimate, and dueling experts would debate the relative 
merit of various methods. The rent-seeking costs could be quite large, since the EPR approach 
would require the regulator to estimate environmental damages with greater precision than for 
environmental regulations generally. Lengthy litigation would be likely.  
Summary 
Muller and Mendelsohn’s vision—a genuinely efficient approach to emissions 
regulation—surely merits attention. While a well-established economics literature identifies 
likely efficiency gains from equating marginal abatement costs and marginal damages for each 
source, the nonconvexities and uncertainties in marginal damage estimates preclude a claim that 
the science and economics have advanced to the point where regulations can adopt source-
specific damage estimates to enhance efficiency. Simply excluding the sources with negative 
damages from the source-specific trading program may seem like an attractive and minor 
refinement of the EPR proposal, but in fact it raises important new challenges. What should be 
the control policy regarding NOx emissions in the counties with negative damages? Should any 
emissions trading be allowed among these counties or between them and other sources? How 
much confidence should regulators have in marginal damage estimates before identifying some 
as positive and others as negative? Further analysis and review may later indicate that the EPR 
recommendation for source-specific trading could be gainfully applied to a specific subset of 
pollutants and sources—for example, only SO2 emissions from electric generating units. Finally, 
although a comprehensive quantitative uncertainty analysis of the source-specific marginal 
damage estimates represents a significant technical challenge, regulatory authorities will need to 
consider the implications of these uncertainties before deciding whether to incorporate source-
specific marginal damages into a regulatory program.
7 
                                                 
7 Office of Management and Budget’s (2003) Circular A-4 requires agencies to provide a quantitative uncertainty 
analysis of major regulatory actions that would result in benefits or costs that exceed $1 billion per year. Resources for the Future  Fraas and Lutter 
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Figure 1. Marginal Damages in Dollars per Ton of NOx Emissions, Selected Eastern Counties 
 